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KERMIT GOSNELL’S BABIES: ABORTION, 
INFANTICIDE AND LOOKING BEYOND THE MASKS OF 
THE LAW 
By Richard F. Duncan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If, as Laurence Tribe has observed, “all law tells a story,”1 this Article 
tells two stories occurring forty years apart—the story of Justice Harry 
Blackmun and the unborn human beings he covered with the legal mask 
of “potential” lives in Roe v. Wade2 in 1973, and the story of Doctor Kermit 
Gosnell and the unmasked babies he was convicted of murdering in his 
Philadelphia abortion clinic in 2013.3 As Professor Tribe also observes, 
these stories amount to “a clash of absolutes, of life against liberty,”4 and 
therefore they are stories that must be told time and again, until we get 
them right. These stories also demonstrate how legal concepts can be used 
to mask reality, and how peeking beneath the masks of the law5 can blow 
away the fog of legal illusion and give society a starkly different 
perspective from which to view an old constitutional issue. 
II. THE MASKS OF THE LAW 
A. Legal Concepts That Conceal Persons 
One of the great constitutional law scholars of the past fifty years, 
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. of the Ninth Circuit, has observed that “[i]t is 
a propensity of professionals in the legal process to dehumanize by legal 
                                                 
* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. In 
writing this Article I stand on the shoulders of an intellectual giant of the law, Judge John 
T. Noonan of the Ninth Circuit. This Article is dedicated to him and to his enormous 
contribution to the legal profession. 
 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 27 (1990). 
 2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 3 See Jon Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder in 
Late-Term Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-of-
murder.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; See generally Report of the Grand Jury, In re Cnty. 
Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. NO. 0009901-2008, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Report]. As the Grand Jury Report made clear, Gosnell’s 
standard late-term abortion technique was to induce premature birth of “live, viable, babies 
in the third trimester of pregnancy —and then murder[] these newborns by severing their 
spinal cords with scissors.” Id. at 1. 
 4 TRIBE, supra note 1, at 3. Of course, the right to life is really the most fundamental 
means of protecting liberty, because without life there is no liberty. So it is probably more 
correct to describe this issue as concerning a clash between life and liberty on one side, and 
liberty and autonomy on the other. 
 5 See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976). 
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concepts those whom the law affects harshly.”6 He calls this process of 
dehumanization the “masks of the law.”7 
What Noonan means by the masks of the law is the law’s ability to 
use rules and legal concepts to conceal persons who are treated harshly by 
the law. He puts it this way: “By masks in this context I mean ways of 
classifying individual human beings so that their humanity is hidden and 
disavowed.”8  
Perhaps the best historical example of legal masks used to conceal 
human persons is the law’s treatment of the issue of slavery in the United 
States. Suppose the law wants to permit and even sanction slavery, as was 
the case in America before the Civil War. The mask that the legal system 
used to disavow the human dignity of slaves was the mask of “property.”9 
The mask of “property” was what allowed champions of liberty, such as 
George Wythe and Thomas Jefferson, to own slaves and to accept the 
power of the law to treat slaves harshly.10 
For example, as a judge in the state of Virginia, George Wythe, a 
signer of the Declaration of Independence and its embrace of all men being 
created equal, was able to preside over the sale and inheritance of slaves.11 
In one case, Wythe declared that “[t]he property of slaves, whatever be 
their number . . . may be transferred with as little judicial ceremony as a 
single quadruped or article of house or kitchen furniture.”12 As Noonan 
observes, when deciding cases involving slaves, Wythe “could not have 
compassion for each of them as a person and still be a judge. His role in a 
slave system necessitated the use of masks.”13 
As in the case of Wythe, so too in the case of other great Virginians, 
including Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall; economic and cultural 
pragmatism caused them to accept the institution of slavery and “the 
power of the law to convert persons into [property].”14 As Noonan observes, 
“[a]t the critical moments,” these great men employed “the masks of the 
law [to] cover [] the faces of the slaves.”15 
Noonan, quoting Montesquieu, explains even more clearly the need 
for the masks of the law in an age of slavery: “It is impossible that we 
                                                 
 6 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE 153 (1979). 
 7 NOONAN, supra note 5, at 54. 
 8 Id. at 19. 
 9 Id. at 39–40. 
 10 Id. at 29–64. 
 11 Id. at 29. 
 12 Id. at 56 (citing Fowler v. Saunders, 8 Va. (4 Call) 361 (1798)). 
 13 Id. at 58. To his credit, after the death of his wife in 1787, Wythe “freed their slaves, 
a decision made easier by a lack of children expecting an inheritance.” ALAN TAYLOR, THE 
INTERNAL ENEMY: SLAVERY AND WAR IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1832 105 (2013). 
 14 NOONAN, supra note 5, at 59–60. 
 15 Id. at 60. 
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should suppose those people to be men, because if we should suppose them 
to be men, we would begin to believe that we ourselves are not 
Christians.”16 Thus, the law’s masking of slaves served a dual function – 
it hid the humanity of slaves, so judges and the law could treat them like 
an animal or an inanimate chair, and it allowed the white ruling classes 
to think well of themselves by masking the tyranny of the legal system 
they had created. 
Interestingly, the law only treated slaves as nonpersons when it 
served the interests of slave owners to do so. Remarkably, when slaves 
were charged with crimes, they were often held to be legal persons.17 For 
example, in United States v. Amy,18 a slave named Amy was treated both 
as “the property of Samuel W. Hairston” and as a “person” who could be 
held criminally responsible for stealing mail from a post office.19 Chief 
Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit justice, held that although “[i]t is true 
that a slave [was] the property of the master . . . and it [was] equally true 
that he is not a citizen,” nevertheless a slave was indeed a person when 
charged with a crime under the criminal laws.20 According to John M. 
Gregory, the federal prosecutor in the case, the evidence of Amy’s status 
as a person under federal criminal law was palpable: “I cannot prove more 
plainly,” argued Mr. Gregory, “that the prisoner is a person, a natural 
person, at least, than to ask your honors to look at her. There she is. She 
is beyond doubt a human being.”21 Thus, the law masked Amy as the 
property of her master for some purposes, and removed the mask and 
“look[ed] at her” when she was charged as a person who had unlawfully 
stolen mail from a post office.22 Such are the masks of the law. As we 
sometimes tell our students, the law often treats “X as Y for the purposes 
of Z.” But when X is a human being, and Y is a nonperson, great injustices 
may occur. 
However, the jurisprudential magic of the masks of the law can be 
broken if we dare to look beneath the masks, even for the purposes of Z, 
and see the real persons who have been concealed underneath.23 For 
example, consider what happens when Batman’s mask slips, and everyone 
sees Bruce Wayne’s unmasked face. The secret identity is destroyed, and 
everyone now knows that Batman is Bruce Wayne. He is no longer the 
Dark Knight striking fear in the hearts of criminals, but instead merely a 
                                                 
 16 Id. at 48. 
 17 See Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a 
Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2001). 
 18 24 F. Cas. 792 (C.C.D. Va. 1896) (No. 14,445). 
 19 Id. at 793. 
 20 Id. at 809. 
 21 Id. at 795; see also Note, supra note 17, at 1748–49. 
 22 See generally United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792. 
 23 See NOONAN, supra note 5, at 58–59. 
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billionaire, playboy vigilante missing his mommy! There is no getting the 
toothpaste back in the tube once the “spell is broken” and the human face 
under the mask is revealed.24 In order to abolish slavery, you must dispel 
the magic of the masks of the law, and invite society to look into the eyes 
of the real persons concealed by the masks.25 
B. Literature and Popular Culture Peeking Beneath Legal Masks 
“[T]he masks of the law” are a type of legal fiction, “magical ways by 
which persons are removed from the legal process.”26 As Noonan explains 
lucidly, “[a]t the points of a legal system where it is too much to recognize 
that a human being exists, a mask is employed. The intolerable strain is 
relieved.”27 
But great literature and even the popular culture often give us a peek 
behind the masks of the law and enable society to see the real persons 
concealed by legal fictions.28 For example, in Mark Twain’s The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn there is a passage concerning a steamboat 
explosion in which Aunt Sally asks Huck if anyone was injured.29 When 
Huck replies “No’m” and notes that only a slave had been killed, Aunt 
Polly responds: “Well, it’s lucky: because sometimes people do get hurt.”30 
The reader, of course, is aware that Aunt Sally is looking at the mask of 
property, not the real human being who was killed in the explosion. 
There is also a powerful example of slavery and the masks of the law 
in the recent Oscar-winning film, Twelve Years a Slave.31 It is the scene in 
which the cruel slave-owner, Master Epps, brutally whips Patsey, a 
female slave.32 He literally tears the flesh off her back with a bull whip for 
a minor act of disobedience.33 Solomon Northrup, who was kidnapped and 
sold into slavery, denounces Epps for his inhumanity: “Thoudevil!” says 
Solomon. “Sooner or later, somewhere in the course of eternal justice, thou 
shalt answer for this sin!” To which Epps replies with a mask: “Sin? There 
is no sin. A man does how he pleases with his property.”34 Of course, the 
                                                 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id. 
 26 Id. at 25–26. 
 27 Id. at 26. 
 28 See generally MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (The 
Floating Press 2008) (1884). 
 29 Id. at 397; NOONAN, supra note 5, at 11. 
 30 TWAIN, supra note 28, at 398. 
 31 Twelve Years a Slave (20th Century Fox Home Entertainment 2013). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.; 12 Years a Slave, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2024544/?ref_=nv_sr_1 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
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modern viewer clearly recognizes that Epps is using a legal concept to 
mask his unjust treatment of a real human being. 
C. Warfare and Physical Distance as a Mask 
Scholars of warfare also recognize this concept of masking the enemy 
and how physical distance makes it easier to kill.35 For example, in a book 
with the remarkable title On Killing, a standard textbook studied in The 
Marine Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman has a chart that 
demonstrates the spectrum of killing from up close and personal (for 
example, hand-to-hand combat) to maximum range by means of bombs or 
missiles.36 Colonel Grossman demonstrates that “the resistance to killing 
becomes increasingly more intense” as we move from long range killing to 
close range killing.37 
It is far easier for a bomber to kill an entire city of noncombatants 
with a bomb or missile, than for a soldier to kill an enemy combatant with 
a bayonet, or in hand-to-hand combat.38 For example, Colonel Grossman 
talks about how during World War II bomber crews on both sides killed 
countless women, children, and other noncombatants in cities such as 
Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo and Hiroshima,39 and he describes how they 
were able to do this without thinking of themselves as monsters: 
The pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and gunners in these aircraft were 
able to bring themselves to kill these civilians primarily through 
application of the mental leverage provided to them by the distance 
factor. Intellectually, they understood the horror of what they were 
doing. Emotionally, the distance involved permitted them to deny it . . . . 
From a distance, I can deny your humanity; and from a distance, I 
cannot hear your screams.40 
It is emotionally traumatic to look into the eyes of another human 
being and drive a bayonet into his heart at close range—even when you 
know he is trying to do the same thing to you.41 It is much easier to push 
a button from thousands of feet above the ground and drop a bomb on a 
populated city, when all you can see are buildings and ant-like dots on the 
                                                 
 35 See generally DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF 
LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 97 (rev. ed. 2009). 
 36 Id. at XV, 98. 
 37 Id. at 98. 
 38 Id. Colonel Grossman graphically explains how psychologically difficult it is to kill 
an enemy at close range: “This process culminates at the close end of the spectrum, when 
the resistance to bayonetting or stabbing becomes tremendously intense, and killing with 
the bare hands (through such common martial arts techniques as crushing the throat with 
a blow or gouging a thumb through the eye and into the brain) becomes almost unthinkable.” 
Id. 
 39 Id. at 100–02. 
 40 Id. at 101–02. 
 41 See id. at 97–98. 
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ground.42 The humanity of the women and children and other 
noncombatants living in the city being bombed is masked by distance, the 
bombardiers launch their bombs and missiles at “targets” not at fellow 
human beings.43 
D. What Should Judges and Lawyers Do About the Masks of the Law? 
If the masks of the law are legal concepts or legal fictions used to 
conceal persons who are treated harshly by the law,44 how should ethical 
judges and lawyers respond? Judge Noonan suggests that there are two 
very different types of masks employed in the legal system—”those 
imposed on others and those put on oneself.”45 One class of masks is used 
to conceal persons wronged by the law, such as the use of the mask of 
“property” to conceal human beings subjected to slavery.46 A second type 
of mask is used to conceal individual judges, lawyers, and law professors 
when they employ the first type of mask to oppress others. For example, 
a judge will speak of a decision by “the court,” thus becoming “[t]he 
masked author of a judicial opinion;”47 and judges, lawyers and law 
professors, when working with legal concepts created to conceal the 
humanity of others, may claim that they have no choice but to follow the 
commands of “[t]he law” or the Constitution.48 As Noonan puts it, “The 
masks of the law . . . are invented and employed by the ruling class to 
cover their own aggression, to cover over the faces of those they exploit.”49 
Thus, if justice is to prevail, and the legal system is to speak the truth 
and reflect reality, judges, lawyers, law professors and other legal 
professionals must look beyond the masks and the fictions of the law and 
focus on all persons with a stake in a legal decision or rule. We must speak 
out when we see a legal mask, and seek to restore the person concealed by 
the mask by responding with “rational criticism” and “historical 
                                                 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. at 108. Many years ago, the French philosopher, Denis Diderot, said 
something similar: “I feel quite sure that were it not for fear of punishment, many people 
would have fewer qualms at killing a man who was far enough away to appear no larger 
than a swallow than in butchering a steer with their own hands.” Denis Diderot, Letter on 
the Blind For the Use of Those Who See, in DIDEROT’S SELECTED WRITINGS 17 (Lester G. 
Crocker, ed., Derek Coltman trans., 1966). 
 44 See NOONAN, supra note 5; see also NOONAN, supra note 6, at 153. 
 45 NOONAN, supra note 5, at 21. 
 46 See id. at 29–64. 
 47 Id. at 23. 
 48 See id. at 22. For example, “a judge may speak and even think of the law as an 
invisible companion telling him what he must do.” Id. 
 49 Id. at 23. Thus, the masks used to exploit others “have been stamped with official 
approval by society’s official representatives of reason.” Id. at 22. 
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reconstruction.”50 In other words, we must always look beyond the masks 
of the law and seek the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 
about the law and the human beings affected by the law. 
III. MASKING LIFE IN THE WOMB: HARRY BLACKMUN’S “POTENTIAL” 
LIVES AND THE SUPREME COURT’S ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Masks of Roe 
Although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified 
to abolish slavery, remove the mask of “property” from the human faces of 
the former slaves, and provide for their full and equal citizenship,51 these 
Amendments did not mark the end of judicial masking of those subjected 
to harsh treatment by the law. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment, or at 
least the Supreme Court’s living, breathing version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is the source of Roe v. Wade52 and its masking of unborn 
human beings as mere “potential lives.”53 
Although the Constitution does not speak of abortion nor even hint 
that there is a constitutional right of sexual privacy or reproductive 
autonomy, the Court in Roe created a “super-protected right” of abortion,54 
a right that invalidated the abortion laws of each and every one of the 
several states.55 However, since creating a constitutional right to abortion 
would result in, to say the least, “harsh treatment” of human life in the 
womb, the Court first needed to conceal the unborn child with a legal 
mask.56 
Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion recognized that in a civilized 
society there can be no general right to kill innocent human beings; thus 
                                                 
 50 Id. at 25. Noonan suggests that this process of critical analysis will result in 
“recognition of the persons who speak to us through rules and of the persons to whom the 
rules are spoken.” Id. at 28. 
 51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall 
exist within the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing for equal 
citizenship and equal protection under the law). 
 52 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 164 (1973). 
 53 See id. at 162, 164. 
 54 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 935–36 (1973) (“What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is 
not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the 
specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or 
the nation’s governmental structure.”); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 129, 164–66. See generally 
Reva B. Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the 
Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63 (2013) (discussing reproductive 
rights in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 55 See CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. 
WADE 293 (2013) (explaining how Roe and its companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973) “together invalidated the laws of all fifty states”). 
 56 See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 153. 
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the nature of the fetus was the critical issue before the Court in Roe v. 
Wade.57 Acknowledging “the well-known facts of fetal development,”58 
Justice Blackmun admitted that if the Court were to recognize the fetus 
as “a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,”59 the case for a right to abortion would “collapse[], for the 
fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the 
Amendment.”60 Indeed, even if the fetus is not a constitutional person 
within the express understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
after all was ratified to deal with the issues of slavery and race not those 
of the sexual revolution and the reproductive autonomy of modern 
women,61 the case for an abortion liberty would fail if the Court were 
simply to acknowledge that the fetus is a living human being whose life 
may be protected by state laws prohibiting abortion. In Roe, the State of 
Texas argued this point explicitly, urging the Court to recognize that it 
had a compelling state interest “in protecting [human life in the womb] 
from and after conception.”62 
Justice Blackmun, however, while purporting to take no position on 
“the difficult question of when life begins,”63 in fact did take a position and 
held that the fetus was neither a “person” within the protection of the 
Constitution,64 nor an actual human life within the protection of state laws 
restricting abortion.65 Instead, Justice Blackmun said that the states may 
not “adopt[] one theory of life” in prohibiting abortion,66 because the fetus 
is only a “potential[] . . . human life.”67 In other words, Justice Blackmun’s 
majority opinion in Roe created a legal mask concealing the actual living 
human life in the womb with the mask of a mere “potential life.” The being 
in the womb was viewed by the court as a “human nonperson,” a mere 
potentiality with no actuality. 68 
                                                 
 57 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 134, 156–57. 
 58 Id. at 156. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 156–57. 
 61 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872) (holding that “the one pervading 
purpose” of the Civil War Amendments was “the freedom of the slave race, the security and 
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and 
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over 
him.”); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. 
 62 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 158. 
 65 See id. at 162. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See generally id.; see also Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, Acorns and Embryos, 
THE NEW ATLANTIS 90, 95–96 (Fall 2004/Winter 2005), available at 
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But, of course, “a potential X must be an actual Y.”69 Surely, there is 
something in the womb, or there would be no need to seek an abortion, 
something living in the womb, or there would be no need to kill it 
surgically or chemically. Indeed, as Robert P. George and Patrick Lee have 
observed, “the well-known facts of fetal development”70 tell us exactly 
what is actually present in the womb of a pregnant woman: 
[The] claim that human embryos are not human beings, or not “full 
human beings,” or merely “potential human life,” simply cannot be 
squared with the facts of human embryogenesis and developmental 
biology. Briefly, modern embryology shows the following: (1) The 
embryo is from the start distinct from any cell of the mother or the 
father, for it is growing in its own distinct direction and its growth is 
internally directed to its own survival and maturation. (2) The embryo 
is human, since it has the genetic constitution and epigenetic primordia 
characteristic of human beings. (3) Most importantly, the embryo is a 
complete or whole organism, though immature. From conception 
onward, the human embryo is fully programmed, and has the active 
disposition, to develop himself or herself to the next mature stage of a 
human being.71 
Of course, Justice Blackmun was correct to point out that there are 
many reasonable theories of moral personhood. For example, in Roe the 
State of Texas argued that moral personhood “begins at conception and is 
present throughout pregnancy.”72 Other theories have focused on the first 
signs of fetal movement in the womb (“quickening”), and “[t]here has 
always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live 
birth.”73 
Some contemporary philosophers and bioethicists, such as Peter 
Singer of Princeton, go so far as to argue that only beings with 
“characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness”74 
count as human beings. Singer is honest enough to admit that, since 
“[i]nfants lack these characteristics,” infanticide “cannot be equated with 
                                                 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/acorns-and-embryos (discussing how fetuses 
are never “human nonpersons”). 
 69 PETER KREEFT, THE UNABORTED SOCRATES 38 (1983). 
 70 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156. 
 71 George & Lee, supra note 68, at 94–95. Remarkably, the Court itself has come to 
realize that “by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living 
organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007). Of course, it is also clear that a human fetus is human, 
thus the being in the womb is a living human organism. 
 72 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 73 Id. at 132, 160. 
 74 See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 182 (2d ed. 1993); see also Faculty, PRINCE 
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR HUMAN VALUES, http://uchv.princeton.edu/people/faculty.php (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
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killing normal human beings.”75 Indeed, Singer is so bold as to suggest 
that parents should have a period of time—he suggests “twenty-eight days 
after birth”—to decide whether “it is better not to continue with a life that 
has begun very badly.”76 He suggests that parents might consider a post-
birth abortion of a newborn human nonperson as a way of “saying no to a 
new life that does not have good prospects.”77 Incredibly, in a recent article 
published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, two distinguished bioethicists 
concluded that because an infant lacks the properties necessary for 
personhood, it has no “moral right to life,” and therefore “killing a newborn 
could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion 
would be,” including in cases in which “the well-being of the family is at 
risk” by birth of an infant child.78 The authors suggest that the practice of 
killing infant human children be called “‘after-birth abortion’, rather than 
‘infanticide’,” in order to reflect their view that “the moral status of the 
individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus.”79 This, of course, is 
nothing more than an attempt to cover the harsh treatment of infants with 
the mask of abortion, to wit, an infant is comparable to a fetus, neither is 
a human being, and thus killing either is ethically acceptable. 
To return to Roe, Justice Blackmun noted that there are many 
reasonable views of when human life begins, and claimed the virtue of 
humility on the question of moral personhood: 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When 
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this 
point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer.80 
But speculate the Court did. By forbidding states from protecting 
human life from the moment of conception, and by holding that an unborn 
child is not an actual human being with a moral right to life, but only a 
“potentiality of human life,”81 the Roe decision created a mask covering 
the humanity of the unborn and placed the Supreme Court’s imprimatur 
on a new constitutional right to take life in the womb from conception until 
                                                 
 75 Singer, supra note 74, at 182. 
 76 PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH 217 (1994). 
 77 Id. at 214. Singer goes on to opine that “our culture” has much to learn from other 
“cultures that practised infanticide.” Id. at 215. In a world in which “we must limit family 
size,” the practice of infanticide is “on solid ground.” Id. 
 78 Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby 
Live?, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 261, 262 (2012). 
 79 Id. at 261–62. 
 80 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 81 Id. at 162–63. 
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birth.82 This is not humility; it is what Justice White referred to as “an 
exercise of raw judicial power.”83 
Indeed, since the Constitution is silent about a right to abortion, and 
since it is at least reasonable to believe that abortion results in the violent 
death of many innocent human beings, authentic judicial humility might 
well have led the Court and Justice Blackmun to defer to state legislatures 
and the process of democratic self-government to resolve the difficult 
moral and legal issue of when human life begins. Suppose Justice 
Blackmun had rephrased the issue before the Court as follows: “Given 
that there is reasonable doubt among intelligent people of good will 
concerning whether abortion violently takes the life of an innocent human 
being, should we allow state legislatures to resolve this doubt in favor of 
protecting unborn human beings by enacting laws prohibiting abortion?” 
Rather than raise and answer that important question, the Court instead 
created the legal mask of potentiality of human life, and forty-one years 
and more than fifty million abortions later, we are still talking about 
abortion, human life in the womb, and the Constitution. 
B. The Extremism of Roe 
Of the many myths and misunderstandings about Roe, by far the 
worst is the one that describes the decision as a modest compromise that 
legalized abortion only during the early stages of pregnancy. A colleague 
of mine actually directed that myth at me during a recent conversation in 
the faculty lounge. He was stunned when I described the extreme scope of 
the abortion liberty as actually decreed by the Court. 
This myth about Roe’s moderation is ubiquitous. It was repeated by 
Thomas Edsall in a New York Times article published in April of 2014, in 
which he described the abortion liberty created in Roe as protecting a right 
to “abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.”84 Indeed, even 
Supreme Court Justices, who certainly should know better, sometimes 
describe Roe as “holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy in its early stages.”85 
But these attempts to play down the extremism of Roe and its 
progeny are, not to put too fine a point on it, dead wrong. In fact, as the 
Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Mary Ann 
                                                 
 82 For a discussion of the extremism of Roe’s abortion doctrine, see supra notes 74–
98 and accompanying text. 
 83 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (explicitly stating 
that his dissenting opinion in Doe also applied to Roe). 
 84 Thomas B. Edsall, Abortion Endures as a Political Tripwire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/opinion/why-does-abortion-endure-as-a-political-
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 85 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (joint opinion of 
O’Connor, J., Kennedy, J., & Souter, J.) (emphasis added). 
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Glendon has explained, the abortion liberty created by the Court in Roe 
“established a regime of abortion-on-demand for the entire nine months of 
pregnancy.”86 
The myth of Roe as a modest compromise based upon fundamental 
constitutional values is itself a mask that serves to conceal the nearly 
absolute abortion liberty created ex nihilo by the Court. The reality of Roe 
is this—a pregnant woman has a constitutional right to terminate a 
pregnancy at any time during the pregnancy and for any reason.87 Late 
term abortions are protected by Roe, right up until the moment of live 
birth; a woman is free to abort her unborn child because it is the wrong 
gender, or the wrong race, or because the child has Down syndrome or 
another disability, or for any other reason that seems sufficient to her.88 
My source for this description of the abortion liberty is the Supreme Court 
itself and its decisions in Roe and Roe’s progeny. 
To start at the beginning, the holding in Roe includes the following 
five features: 
1. Abortion as a Fundamental Right. The Court held that “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.”89 This liberty is a fundamental 
constitutional right, and thus a law restricting this right is unconstitutional 
unless the state justifies the restriction by showing that it was enacted to 
advance a “compelling state interest” and that the law was “narrowly drawn 
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”90 
2. The Trimester Framework: the First Trimester. Although “the 
State . . . ha[s] important and legitimate interest[s]” in “protecting the health 
of the pregnant woman” and “the potentiality of human life” in the womb,91 
neither of these interests is compelling during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.92 Thus, until “approximately the end of the first trimester,”93 all 
state laws restricting abortion are unconstitutional and “the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without 
                                                 
 86 Mary Ann Glendon, From Culture Wars to Building a Culture of Life, in THE COST 
OF CHOICE: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 5 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004); 
FORSYTHE, supra note 55, at 150–51. 
 87 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. 
 88 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. 
 89 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In other words, the abortion liberty is protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a matter of substantive due process. Id. at 
164. 
 90 Id. at 155. 
 91 Id. at 162. 
 92 Id. at 149, 162–63. 
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regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s 
pregnancy should be terminated.”94 
3. The Trimester Framework: The Second Trimester. According to the 
Court, the state’s interest in regulating abortion to protect the health of the 
pregnant woman becomes compelling at the start of the second trimester.95 
Thus, although the state may not restrict her right to choose abortion, it 
“may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation 
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.”96 
The abortion liberty is still triumphant, but the states may regulate abortion 
as a medical procedure to ensure the safety of women undergoing abortion.97 
4. The Trimester Framework: The Third Trimester. Finally, the states 
interest in protecting the “potential life” of the fetus becomes “compelling” at 
the point of fetal “viability,”98 which the Court defined as the point at which 
the fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with 
artificial aid.”99 This, says the Court, usually occurs “at about seven months 
(28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”100 
“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so 
far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary 
to preserve the life or health of the mother.”101 Finally, for the stage of 
pregnancy “subsequent to viability,”102 a state may act to protect what the 
Court continues to mask as the mere “potentiality of human life” by 
prohibiting abortion.103 But there is a catch. Even after viability, during the 
third and final trimester of pregnancy right up to the moment of live birth, 
a pregnant woman has a right to choose abortion whenever “it is necessary, 
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother.”104 
5. The Trimester Framework: The Scope of Post-viability “Health” 
Abortions. If late-term abortions are constitutionally protected so long as the 
pregnant woman’s health is advanced by abortion, the crucial issue becomes 
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 95 Id. at 164–65. 
 96 Id. at 163. 
 97 Id. Examples of permissible health regulations are those relating to “the 
qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion,” and “to the facility in which the 
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 103 Id. at 164–65. 
 104 Id. at 165. 
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how the Supreme Court defines maternal health. The answer to that 
question is provided in Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton,105 which, says 
the Court, must be “read together” with Roe.106 In Doe, Justice Blackmun, 
again writing on behalf of the majority, said that in determining whether an 
abortion is necessary to preserve maternal health, the attending physician 
should exercise his medical judgment “in the light of all factors—physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the 
well-being of the patient.”107 Thus, a pregnant woman has a constitutional 
right to choose a late-term, post-viability abortion whenever the abortion 
doctor determines that her health, including her emotional and familial well-
being, is served by an abortion.108 In other words, although states have a 
theoretical power to proscribe post-viability abortions, no such law may be 
enforced to prohibit any abortion, no matter how late in the pregnancy, if the 
doctor performing the abortion determines in his medical judgment that the 
abortion will protect the emotional or even the familial well-being of the 
pregnant woman. As Clark Forsythe puts it, because the maternal health 
exception for post-viability abortions is so infinitely broad, “[t]here may be 
prohibitions after viability on the books, but they are unenforceable, and any 
time limits that abortion providers observe are only voluntary.”109 Far from 
being a modest holding protecting abortion during early stages of pregnancy, 
the abortion liberty created by the Court in Roe is almost infinitely extreme; 
under Justice Blackmun’s decree, until the human being in the womb 
completes his or her journey through the birth canal and is safely born alive, 
the general “well-being” of the pregnant woman “take[s] precedence” over 
the life of even a fully-developed, nearly-born child. 110 
As Clark Forsythe has observed, the combination of Roe and Doe 
places abortion law in the United States at the extreme end of the 
spectrum “as one of approximately nine countries that allow abortion after 
fourteen weeks and one of only four nations (with Canada, China, and 
North Korea) that allows abortion for any reason after fetal viability.”111 
The Court also nationalized an issue that since the Founding had been 
“determined by state legislatures, state governors, state courts, local 
prosecutors, and state public health officials.”112 
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C. Casey Reaffirms Roe’s Extremism and Roe’s Masks 
In 1992, almost twenty years after Roe was decided, the Supreme 
Court came within one shaky vote of overruling Roe along with its masks 
and its nearly unlimited abortion liberty. Instead, in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,113 the Court reaffirmed the 
“essential holding” of Roe,114 and thereby, in the words of one scholar, 
sought both to “perpetuate Roe” and to “entrench[] abortion rights” in the 
Constitution.115 Although Casey modified Roe’s doctrine to allow some 
abortion regulations to be enacted so long as they do not impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to abortion,116 it reaffirmed the right of 
pregnant women to abort their unwanted pregnancies both pre-viability 
and post-viability, and continued Roe’s masking of unborn human beings 
in the womb by making clear that “[a]t the heart” of the abortion liberty 
“is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”117 
In other words, whether the unborn child in the womb of a pregnant 
woman is a human life is completely subjective—a matter of opinion—and 
only one opinion counts, that of the woman exercising the right to 
abortion. If a pregnant woman is pleased with her pregnancy and wishes 
to recognize the unborn child as a human life, then it is a human life; but 
if the pregnancy is unwanted, and the pregnant woman chooses not to 
recognize the humanity of the child she is carrying, then it is not a human 
life and it may be treated harshly by the woman and her doctor. Such is 
the reality of Casey’s “mystery of human life” passage.118 The mask of 
potential life continues to cover the humanity of lives in the womb, if their 
mothers decide to opt for abortion. 
This is not about liberty. It is about power, the ultimate power to 
decide the value of human life. It is as though the Court channeled 
feminist legal scholar Frances Olsen, who once claimed that “[w]omen 
create children from fertilized eggs; children do not just happen. To think 
a zygote is a baby is to devalue the work that pregnancy requires of a 
woman.”119 According to Olsen’s feminist legal philosophy, the human 
being in the womb does “not have significant value as a person until the 
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woman carrying the fetus instills it with such value.”120 Casey 
constitutionalizes this philosophy to empower pregnant women to mask 
the subjects of the abortion liberty as human non-persons. 
Although Casey reaffirmed what it described as the essential holding 
of Roe, Roe’s trimester framework was reworked into a two-pronged, pre-
viability and post-viability test.121 Prior to viability, “the woman’s right to 
make the ultimate decision” concerning abortion is protected against state 
laws imposing an “undue burden” on her right to abort.122 A state may 
regulate abortion to further its interests in maternal health and potential 
life, but may not impose an undue burden on the abortion liberty.123 “[A]n 
undue burden is an unconstitutional burden,” and a regulation will be 
struck down as “unduly burdensome” if it “has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.”124 After viability, Casey reaffirms Roe’s rule allowing 
the states to prohibit “abortion except where it is necessary . . . for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.”125 Thus, under Casey as 
under Roe, the woman’s ultimate decision to choose abortion is protected 
post-viability, right up to the moment of live birth, so long as the abortion 
doctor determines that a late-term abortion is an appropriate means of 
protecting the mother’s physical, psychological, emotional, or familial 
well-being.126 
If Casey has any redeeming quality or silver lining, it is its holding 
allowing states to regulate abortion to protect fetal life, even before 
viability, so long as the regulation does not unduly burden the woman’s 
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.127 Thus, laws “which do no 
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may 
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they 
are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to 
choose” abortion.128 The states may beg for the life of a child, but they may 
not act to protect its life.129 But still, this is more than Roe allowed, so 
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perhaps it is best to be grateful for some recognition by the Court of the 
value of human life in the womb. 
D. Gonzales v. Carhart: Partial Birth Abortions Banned So Long as 
Not One Life Saved 
In Gonzales v. Carhart,130 the Supreme Court upheld the federal 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.131 Although the Court allowed 
Congress to prohibit “partial-birth abortions,” it did so only because 
another method of abortion was permitted. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg 
observed in her impassioned dissent, “[t]he law saves not a single fetus 
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”132 
As both the majority and dissenting Justices explained in Gonzales, 
there are two common methods used to perform late term abortions (i.e., 
those performed after the first three months of pregnancy)—the standard 
or “nonintact D & E” and the “partial-birth” or “intact D & E.”133 When 
performing a standard D & E procedure, the abortion doctor first dilates 
the pregnant woman’s cervix, and then “inserts grasping forceps” into the 
uterus and uses the forceps “to grab the fetus” and literally “tear [it] apart” 
piece by piece: 
For example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through 
the cervix and out of the woman. The process of evacuating the fetus 
piece by piece continues until it has been completely removed. A doctor 
may make 10 to 15 passes with the forceps to evacuate the fetus in its 
entirety, though sometimes removal is completed with fewer passes. 
Once the fetus has been evacuated, the placenta and any remaining 
fetal material are suctioned or scraped out of the uterus. The doctor 
examines the different parts to ensure the entire fetal body has been 
removed.134 
On the other hand, when performing a partial-birth D & E, the 
abortion doctor “extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its 
entire body, instead of ripping it apart,” lodges its head in the cervix, 
makes an incision with scissors into the base of the skull of the fetus, and 
finally uses a suction catheter to “evacuate[] the skull contents.”135 Or as 
a nurse who witnessed a partial-birth abortion testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the abortion doctor “deliver[s] the baby’s body and 
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the arms—everything but the head,” and then, using scissors and a 
suction tube, literally “suck[s] the baby’s brains out.”136 
As interpreted by the Court, the Act prohibited only intact D & E 
abortions.137 Thus, although one method of abortion was forbidden by the 
Act, it did not prohibit the standard D & E procedure.138 This was critical 
to the Court’s decision, because, since the law did not prohibit any woman 
from making the ultimate decision to abort the child she was carrying, it 
did not impose an undue burden on the right to choose abortion even 
though it applied “both previability and postviability.”139 As Justice 
Ginsburg noted, the Act did not save even one child “from destruction,” 
because it prohibited only one “method” of abortion.140 Ginsburg concluded 
that this rendered the Act completely irrational, because it did not serve 
its stated objective of “preserving life.”141 Although Justice Kennedy and 
the majority seemed to believe that, since partial birth abortions are 
shockingly similar to the killing of a newborn baby, the law served to draw 
a bright line between abortion and infanticide.142 Justice Ginsburg 
reasoned, the “notion that either of these two equally gruesome 
procedures . . . is more akin to infanticide than the other . . . is simply 
irrational.”143 
It is difficult to reject Ginsburg’s logic—in effect the Act says it is 
unlawful to kill an unborn child in the living room, but it is perfectly 
lawful to kill the same child in the kitchen. Surely, if partial birth 
abortions are akin to infanticide, so too are nonintact D & E abortions. 
Why should it matter where the violent act occurs? However, Roe and 
Casey require that state laws regulating abortion are constitutional only 
if they do not impose a substantial obstacle on the abortion decision; 
accordingly, the Constitution as created by the Court requires that at least 
one of the two “equally gruesome” methods of taking life must be 
allowed.144 Such is the extremism of the abortion liberty in Kermit 
Gosnell’s America. 
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IV. KERMIT GOSNELL’S MURDER CONVICTION: A PEAK BEHIND THE 
MASKS OF THE LAW 
The saga of Kermit Gosnell is a true story “about a doctor who killed 
babies and endangered women.”145 It is a tale about an abortion doctor 
who specialized in late-term abortions146 and whose standard abortion 
technique “was to induce labor and delivery of intact fetuses.”147 The 
Grand Jury in Gosnell’s criminal case explained what happened when 
Gosnell performed late-term abortions by inducing premature labor: 
When you perform late-term “abortions” by inducing labor, you get 
babies. Live, breathing, squirming babies. By 24 weeks, most babies 
born prematurely will survive if they receive appropriate medical care. 
But that was not what the Women’s Medical Society was about. Gosnell 
had a simple solution for the unwanted babies he delivered: he killed 
them. He didn’t call it that. He called it “ensuring fetal demise.” The 
way he ensured fetal demise was by sticking scissors into the back of 
the baby’s neck and cutting the spinal cord. He called that “snipping.”148 
Of course, when your standard method of “abortion” is to violently 
kill living, newborn babies, you may well find yourself charged with 
multiple counts of murder. Indeed, Gosnell was charged, tried and 
convicted of first-degree murder for killing “Baby A, Baby C, and Baby D,” 
three newborn infants who “lived a few fleeting moments outside their 
mothers’ wombs before their spinal cords were severed” by the good 
doctor.149 Gosnell is currently in prison serving three life sentences 
without the possibility of parole.150 
A. Gosnell’s Serial Murder of Born-Alive Babies 
Although Gosnell was probably guilty of killing hundreds—or even 
thousands—of born-alive human infants, “there was only enough evidence 
to indict him for seven, and of those he was ultimately convicted for three” 
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counts of first-degree murder.151 The Grand Jury concluded that the 
killing of live, viable babies “really had to be part of Gosnell’s plan,”152 
because “[t]he policy he instituted and carried out was not to try to revive 
live, viable babies. It was to kill them.”153 
Gosnell specialized in late-term abortions, those involving 
pregnancies that “were well beyond 24 weeks.”154 The best way to 
understand the horror of Gosnell’s abortion practice is to focus on his tiny 
victims. These are some of their stories. 
1. Baby Boy A 
 
Baby Boy A was born in Gosnell’s abortion clinic in July of 2008 to a 
seventeen year old mother.155 Although one of Gosnell’s employees, 
Kareema Cross, recorded a gestational age of 29.4 weeks,156 a 
neonatologist testified that the child “was at least 32 weeks, if not 
more.”157 Doctor Gosnell induced labor and the mother gave birth to a 
living, breathing, moving baby boy.158 Baby Boy A was large, so large in 
fact that Gosnell joked that “[t]his baby is big enough to walk around with 
me or walk me to the bus stop.”159 Gosnell completed this post-birth 
abortion by snipping Baby Boy A’s neck and placing him in a shoebox for 
disposal.160 Cross, a witness to this gruesome procedure, testified that “she 
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saw the baby move after his neck was cut, and after the doctor placed it 
in the shoebox.”161 In testimony before the Grand Jury, a neonatologist 
opined that the fact that the infant victim “continued to move after his 
spinal cord was cut with scissors means that he did not die instantly” and 
that “his few moments of life were spent in excruciating pain.”162 Doctor 
Gosnell was convicted of first-degree murder for this horrific, post-birth 
abortion of Baby Boy A.163 
2. Some of Gosnell’s Other Victims 
Although “Baby Boy A was among the more memorable babies that 
Gosnell killed,”164 there were many more. Ashley Baldwin, another of 
Gosnell’s employees, “remembered Gosnell severing the neck of a baby 
that cried after being born.”165 Gosnell also trained his staff to cut the 
spines of born-alive babies.166 Steve Massof, an unlicensed medical school 
graduate hired by Gosnell to practice medicine in his clinic,167 was trained 
by Gosnell to cut the spines of born alive babies.168 Massof testified what 
Gosnell expected of him when babies were born alive when Gosnell was 
away from the clinic: “So what I would do is, I’d make sure that when—if 
the fetus precipitated, the cord was cut. Also, a standard procedure, the 
cervical spine was cut.”169 He further testified that “Gosnell cut the spinal 
cord ‘100 percent of the time’” in late-term abortions “and that he did so 
after the baby was delivered.”170 The Grand Jury Report summarizes the 
shocking testimony of Gosnell’s employees as follows: 
Gosnell’s staff testified about scores of gruesome killings of such born-
alive infants carried out mainly by Gosnell, but also by employees Steve 
Massof, Lynda Williams, and Adrienne Moton. These killings became 
so routine that no one could put an exact number on them. They were 
considered “standard procedure.” Yet some of the slaughtered were so 
fully formed, so much like babies that should be dressed and taken 
home, that even clinic employees who were accustomed to the practice 
were shocked.171 
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The bottom line on Gosnell’s career as a late-term abortion doctor is 
that his practice made him “America’s most horrifying serial killer.”172 
Although he was convicted of only three murders, he probably “killed 
thousands of live, viable children throughout the course of his decades 
long career in Philadelphia.”173 
The question one should ask in the wake of the Gosnell case is this—
if all can agree that what Gosnell did was not just morally wrong, but 
horrifically, morally wrong, what does this tell us about the larger 
question of Roe and its extremism? If post-birth abortions are infanticide, 
and partial-birth abortions are wrong because they are practically 
indistinguishable from post-birth abortions, “what else follows?”174 
B. After Gosnell: Looking Beyond the Masks of the Law 
It is a matter of nearly universal consensus that Kermit Gosnell is a 
“monster,”175 a “serial killer,”176 a “butcher,”177 and a justly-convicted 
murderer of innocent children.178 And yet, his crime was a mere “matter 
of geography.”179 Whether a particular abortion takes place inside or 
outside the womb is the difference between a fundamental constitutional 
right and first-degree murder.180 How can this be? 
I think the answer lies in the masks of the law. When abortions take 
place inside the womb, the faces of those who are aborted are concealed by 
the masks of the law and only “potential life” is extinguished. However, if 
the exact same human beings are the subjects of post-birth abortions, they 
are unmasked and viewed as actual lives, as living, breathing, newborn 
babies, and when the abortionist inserts scissors into the back of their 
necks and cuts their spinal cords he is guilty of murder. In other words, if 
Baby Boy A had been aborted in utero by means of a nonintact D & E 
procedure, Kermit Gosnell would be in law what he believes himself to be 
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as he sits unrepentantly in prison—a champion of women’s reproductive 
autonomy and a soldier in the “war against poverty.”181 
Which is it? Is Gosnell a hero, or is he a monster? It all depends upon 
the masks of the law and whether we peek behind the masks and into the 
faces of Baby Boy A and those like him who are the subjects of the abortion 
liberty. 
Under Roe and its progeny, Gosnell’s crime was not killing Baby Boy 
A and the other victims of his post-birth abortion practice. Gosnell’s crime 
was a crime of geography—kill Baby Boy A in the kitchen and it is a 
constitutionally-protected right; kill Baby Boy A in the living room, at the 
same moment in time, and it is murder. This is so because even post-
viability, right up to the moment of live birth, a pregnant woman has a 
constitutional right to choose abortion so long as her abortion doctor 
determines that the abortion is necessary to protect her physical, 
emotional, psychological or familial well-being.182 In other words, under 
Roe human beings who are indistinguishable from Baby Boy A are killed 
every day by perfectly legal, late-term abortions that take place in utero. 
Baby Boy A was a person under the law not because of who or what 
he was, but because of where he was when he was aborted. Because he 
was outside of the womb, the mask was removed and all of America could 
see his violent death for exactly what it was—an act of gruesome murder. 
If the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is correct, and if Baby 
Boy A could indeed have been legally aborted in utero so long as Doctor 
Gosnell had determined that his mother’s well-being was served by a late-
term abortion, then perhaps Gosnell is right to believe that he is a 
“spiritually innocent” hero rather than a monstrous murderer.183 As 
Michael Stokes Paulsen has put it, “Gosnell followed the horrid moral 
logic of Roe all the way to its horrid logical conclusion.”184 But if Gosnell is 
justly guilty of murder for performing abortions outside, rather than 
inside, the womb, then it seems logical to question the justice of Roe’s 
extremism. As Paulsen puts it: 
If what Gosnell did is not wrong, nothing is wrong. But what Gosnell 
did is not really much different from what any other abortionist does 
every day. If people can be brought to moral sense with a story that 
reaches them and convicts them in their hearts and souls, then 
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perhaps—perhaps—they can be persuaded to retrace, and repent of, the 
deadly logic of abortion with their minds.185 
Paulsen is right. By removing the masks of the law from the tiny 
victims of Gosnell’s abortion practice, our Nation had a rare moment of 
clarity about Roe and the abortion liberty. The true story of Gosnell’s 
unmasked babies opened a “window into reality”186 and gave the nation an 
opportunity to think and think again about Roe and Casey and the 
millions of masked babies whose brief lives continue to be ended by the 
fundamental liberty of abortion-on-demand. 
V. A NARRATIVE AND A CONCLUSION: I’VE LOOKED AT ROE FROM 
BOTH SIDES NOW 
I have been on both sides of this issue. I was in law school when Roe 
was decided way back in 1973. To be precise, Roe was decided in January 
of 1973187 and in August of 1973 I was a brand new, baby 1L at Cornell 
Law School. I have always had a libertarian streak, and I supported Roe 
at the time and was very strongly pro-choice, so outspokenly pro-choice 
that my best friend in law school, who was pro-life, wanted to hit me more 
than a few times. 
I have changed my mind over the years, and now I am pro-life. I was 
not a worse person when I was pro-choice, and I am not a better person 
now because I am pro-life. I have just thought about the issue for many 
years, and changed my mind. 
However, my change-of-mind was not just a matter of reading and 
thinking. I had a rush of reason in 1978, when I learned I was going to 
become a father. Although my son was a mere potential life under Roe as 
he grew in the womb, my then-wife and I already knew that we had a 
child. We took away the distance factor, looked beneath the mask, and 
embraced the real, human life that was an actuality, not a mere 
potentiality. 
But now my hair is white and I look at life through the eyes of a much 
older man. I have three daughters, three beautiful, young women, and I 
want every one of their dreams to be realized. Much of my energy and 
treasure is spent helping them get the education and opportunities they 
need to fulfill their dreams. But is the abortion liberty something upon 
which they should build their lives and dreams? 
I think we all need to keep thinking and talking about the abortion 
issue, because there is a lot at stake on both sides and it is critically 
important that we get it right. As one scholar has said: “[a]bortion is too 
much like infanticide on the one hand, and too much like contraception on 
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the other, to leave one comfortable with any answer . . . . [T]he moral 
dilemma abortion poses is so difficult as to be heartbreaking.”188 
I believe that the only way to resolve this impossibly difficult moral 
dilemma is to put away all the legal masks and look into the eyes of all 
the stakeholders in this heartbreaking matter of life and death. The 
dreams and lives of those who are already born are critically important, 
but so too are the lives of the actual human beings living in the wombs of 
their mothers. 
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